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to which the government may put its easement may change accordingly.
If what the government wishes to do with its easement is to restrict use
of public trust property altogether, that is, to preserve the property in
its natural state, riparian owners cannot complain that something has
been taken from them. Whatever rights they had, whatever the nature
of their ownership in the soil under the water, they took their property
subject to the public easement. 3
There is room for much abuse if the government carries the public
trust rationale too far. On one hand, there must be limits to the type of
use the government wishes to make of its easement. If the legislature
were to find, for example, that the most pressing public need with
respect to tidal waters was to derive revenue from their sale, other
aspects of public trust law must intervene to prohibit the destruction of
the trust.54 On the other hand, the legal theory of public trust easement
whereby the government can prohibit development of wetlands areas by
owners in fee of the subsoil will leave many persons who have made
substantial investments in coastal property with very little to show for
their expenditure and probably very little in the way of remedy. For
these reasons, fairness dictates that the avenue opened by Marks v.
Whitney be taken as merely a stopgap approach to the prevention of
wetlands destruction.
MARIANNE K. SMYTHE
Estate Tax and the Closely Held Corporation-A Nearly Fatal Blow to
Section 2036
Many a tax consultant who has a client with a majority interest in
a closely held corporation has been looking for a way for his client to
avoid estate taxes on such stock without having to give up control of
his corporation in the process. In United States v. Byrum' the Supreme
Court has provided such an opportunity. According to the Court's inter-
pretation of section 2036 of the Internal Revenue Code,2 the majority
"In Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navig. Control Authority, 171 So. 2d 376, 388 (Fla.
1965), the dissenting opinion found "the retained inalienable trust doctrine" to be sufficient
grounds to deny compensation to an owner of the tidelands denied a permit to dredge and fill.
5 Professor Sax devotes much of his article, supra note 33, to the problem of preserving the
public-trust servitude in spite of legislative indifference and hostility.
192 S. Ct. 2382 (1972).
'INT, . REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036 provides:
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stockholders of closely held corporations will be able to have their cake
and eat it, too. The majority stockholder may now put his stock in trust,
retain the voting rights, and retain control over disposition of any assets
in the trust, which enables him to maintain control over his corporation
without fear that the stock will be included in his gross estate for federal
estate tax purposes.
The decedent in Byrum created an irrevocable trust to which he
transferred a portion of his shares of stock in three closely held corpora-
tions.3 The trusts were created for the benefit of his children or, in the
event of their death before the termination of the trust, his grandchil-
dren. An independent corporation was designated as the sole trustee
with broad and detailed powers to administer and control the trust
property in its sole discretion, subject to the rights reserved by the
decedent to vote all shares of stock in the trust, to disapprove the sale
or transfer of any trust assets, to approve investments and reinvest-
ments, and to remove the trustee and designate another corporate trus-
tee to serve as successor. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue in-
cluded the value of the transferred shares in the decedent's gross estate
on the grounds that the retained control of the corporations gave the
decedent continued employment, remuneration, and the right to deter-
mine whether the corporations would be liquidated or merged., These
retained benefits gave the decedent the "possession and enjoyment"
required under section 2036(a)(1). 5 In addition, the Commissioner in-
cluded the stock under section 2036(a)(2), concluding that the retained
(a) GENERAL RULE-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made
a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his
life or for any period which does not in fact end before his death-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the prop-
erty, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the
persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.
'The percentage ownership after transfer was as follows:
Percentage owned Percentage owned Total by
by Decedent by the Trust Both
Byrum Lithographing Co., Inc. 59% 12% 71%
Graphic Realty, Inc. 35% 48% 83%
Bychrome Co. 42% 46% 88%
92 S. Ct. at 2387 n.2.
'Id. at 2395.
5See note 2 supra.
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right to vote the stock and to veto any stock transfer by the trustee
enabled the decedent to maintain control over corporate dividend pol-
icy, thus enabling the decedent to shift or defer the beneficial enjoyment
of the trust income between present income beneficiaries and remainder-
men. The Court rejected the Commissioner's arguments for inclusion
under both subsections in a six-to-three decision. The Court's opinion
on the application of each sub-section will be examined in turn.
First, the Court held that reserving management powers over the
trust without more was not enough to qualify under the "possession and
enjoyment" provision of section 2036(a)(1).' The Byrum Court distin-
guished "possession and enjoyment" of the "property" from "control"
of the corporation. The government conceded that the mere retention
of the right to vote shares did not constitute the type of "possession and
enjoyment" contemplated by the statute. However, they argued that
control was covered by the statute. The Court's response was that
Byrum transferred only stock, not "control," because the trust never
owned as much as fifty percent of the stock of any one corporation.
7
The Court said that he retained not "income from or the use of the
property," 8 but control of the corporation by retaining the right to vote
the shares he owned and those he placed in trust.'Because control was
not an attribute of property that was given up, the stock was not includi-
ble.10 The Court said, "The statutory language plainly contemplates
retention of an attribute of the property transferred-such as a right to
income, use of the property itself, or a power of appointment with
respect either to income or principal."" However, even if "control" had
been considered "property" and thereby had been covered by section
2036(a)(1), the necessary criteria for inclusion would still not have been
met. 2 "Enjoyment" has been defined as connoting a "substantial pres-
ent economic benefit."' !3 The Court could find no "substantial present
892 S. Ct. at 2395.
7See note 3 supra.
892 S. Ct. at 2396-97.
Vd. at 2396. Only when the decedent retains the income from or the use of the property is it
included. United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969); Commissioner v. Estate of
Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949); Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959). But see Estate of Pamela D. Holland, 1 T.C. 564 (1943).
""Indeed, at the time of his death he still owned a majority of the shares in the largest of the
corporations and probably would have exercised control of the other two by virtue of being a large
stockholder in each." 92 S. Ct. at 2397.
"Id. at 2397.
2id.
"Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480, 486 (1946); see, e.g., Estate of McNichol
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economic benefit" retained by Byrum in his power to liquidate or merge
the corporation, since this right was not a "present" benefit. In addition,
the Court said that the restrictions imposed on Byrum by the Internal
Revenue Service" and his "fiduciary duty" to minority stockholders"
were sufficient to prevent any substantial benefit from his continued
employment and compensation. 6
The government's primary contention was that the decedent's con-
trol of the dividend policy of the corporations and control over the
disposition of the stock itself enabled him to distribute the "possession
and enjoyment" of the property between the income beneficiaries and
the remaindermen. The Byrum Court disagreed, relying on two cases
in which the decedent retained powers over the trust, Estate of Willard
V. King 7 and Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 8 which the Court stated
involved retained powers essentially the same as Byrum's retained pow-
ers. Although neither of these cases was controlling," the Court ap-
peared to say that if a taxpayer had relied on the case law as he saw it,
the courts would not overturn such a "principle of taxation.""0 In both
of the cases there was no power to designate who should enjoy the
v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959); Yeazel v. Coyle,
68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 87,384 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)(1) will not allow a tax deduction for a salary payment
which is not an ordinary and necessary business expense.
1192 S. Ct. at 2393 n.18. Under Ohio law minority shareholders may bring derivative suits.
OHio R. Civ. P. 23.1.
"See, e.g., Estate of William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 790, modifying 4 T.C. 542 (1945). (even
though the settlor retained control of the corporation through an employment contract, if he
rendered services for the corporation and the compensation was reasonable then there would be
no inclusion).
1737 T.C. 973 (1962). King created three trusts and transferred securities to a third party
trustee. The income was to be paid to certain designated beneficiaries for life with remainders over
to designated remaindermen. The trustee could exercise the rights of management and investment
only in accordance with the directions of the settlor. The trust holdings of securities were at no
time significant from the point of view of control of the particular companies involved. The trust
assets were held non-includable in his gross estate.
1"278 U.S. 339 (1929). In Reinecke the decedent created five trusts with life interests to the
income designated in certain beneficiaries. He reserved the "power to supervise the reinvestment
of trust funds, to require the trustee to execute proxies to his nominee, to vote" the shares held by
the trust, and to control leases executed by the trustee. Id. at 344. The trust assets were held not
includable in the decedent's gross estate since the mere retention of management powers will not
render the trust includable in his gross estate.
"The Court recognized that neither of these cases was controlling since one was an unappealed
Tax Court decision and the other was decided before the present § 2036 was enacted. However,
they did carry weight as a reliance factor. 92 S. Ct. at 2389.
20 d. "Courts properly have been reluctant to depart from an interpretation of tax law which
has been generally accepted when the departure could have potentially far-reaching consequences."
[Vol. 51
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income from the transferred property.21
The majority also rejected the argument that United States v.
O'Malley"2 compelled the inclusion of the trust. Byrum did not retain a
right "to designate the person who shall possess or enjoy the property"
as required by section 2036(a)(2).21 The Court interpreted "right" as
used in the statute as an "ascertainable and legally enforceable
power." 4 O'Malley's legal right to accumulate or distribute the income
in his discretion put him squarely within the net of section 2036.25 Ac-
cording to the majority, Byrum reserved no right to tell the trustee how
to distribute the income of the trust. Byrum's power to elect the direc-
tors of the corporations conferred no legal right to command the pay-
ment or nonpayment of dividends. In the view of the majority, the power
to declare dividends is vested solely in the corporate board of directors,
not with the majority stockholder. The dividend policy of the corpora-
tion is subject to business and economic considerations, the threat of
derivative suits,28 the sufficiency of retained earnings,27 and the accumu-
lated earnings tax.2 The majority stockholder is also restricted by a
fiduciary duty to the minority stockholders not to misuse his powers.
29
The government sought to equate this defacto position of a controlling
stockholder with the "legally enforceable right" specified in the statute
and applied in O'Malley. The majority, however, felt that the decedent
was sufficiently restricted in his defacto power to eliminate any substan-
tial benefit he might receive by his position; therefore, there was no
2The two settlors in King and Reinecke did not have power to distinguish between the income
beneficiaries or the remaindermen. The powers retained were management over the trust assets.
The settlors did have control over any of the corporations whose stock was transferred to the trusts.
The management powers alone did not permit the settlors to designate who shall enjoy the prop-
erty. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 344, 346 (1929); Estate of Willard V. King,
37 T.C. 973, 974, 980 (1962).
-383 U.S. 627 (1966). O'Malley created five irrevocable trusts in which he reserved the "right"
in the trust agreement along with two other persons to accumulate the income in their sole
discretion and thus was able to "designate" between the income beneficiaries and the remainder-
men. The trust corpus and the accumulated income were held to be includible in his gross estate.
Id. at 629, 634.




2See note 22 supra.
21See note 15 supra.
2See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 1500 (West Supp. 1971). For liability of directors see
id. § 825 (West 1955).
"INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 531 (an accumulated earnings tax penalty is imposed on the
improper accumulation of surplus).
11H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES § 240 (2d ed. 1970).
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inclusion.'0
It is clear that an inter vivos transfer of stock in a closely held
corporation which is qualified only by the settlor's implied retention"
of control of the stock through his management of the corporation,
without more, does not qualify as a taxable testamentary disposition."
The retention of management powers33 or voting rights ' of the stock
in trust does not put the transfer within section 2036(a)(1) because these
powers do not convey any direct benefit to the settlor. The trustee may
still use the assets of the trust, including the stock, to benefit the income
beneficaries because the settlor has not retained control over the use or
disposition of the stock.35 The majority relied heavily on Reinecke v.
Northern Trust Co.3 1 to support its holding; however, the dissent very
clearly distinguished Reinecke from Byrum on its facts. The Reinecke
settlor, through his shares of stock and those he could vote in trust,
could not control any of the corporations whose stock was placed in
trust.37 The Court failed to recognize that Byrum's control and powers
over the trust were more extensive than any of the fact situations in the
cases cited by the majority.38
192 S. Ct. at 2394.
31Soled, Estate Tax Consequences of Inter Vivos Transfers of Stock in a Closely-Held
Corporation, 31 MD. L. REv. 191, 221-25 (1971), gives a good discussion of the implied retention
theory and how the government has attempted to utilize it.
"Section 2036 taxes inter vivos transfers when the objective intent or operation of the transfer
is a testamentary disposition. The government has consistently argued for inclusion based on the
management powers retained by a decedent over the corporation even though no direct control of
the stock in trust was provided for. The courts have been uniform in rejecting this "implied"
retention theory based solely on powers of management. See, e.g., Gardner v. Delaney, 103 F.
Supp. 610 (D. Mass. 1952).
'-See, e.g., Estate of William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 790, modifying 4 T.C. 542 (1945).
"-See, e.g., Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971-1 CuI.
BULL. 1.
'Id. The Beckwith trustee could still dispose of the stock and take back the voting rights of
the stock in trust. These powers of the trustee prevented the settlor from effectively exercising any
control over the disposition or accumulation of the income. They also prevented any benefit from
accruing to the settlor.
'6278 U.S. 339 (1929). It should be noted that this case was decided before the current § 2036
or its predecessor § 811(c) (Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(c), 53 Stat. 121). See note 18
supra.
3792 S. Ct. at 2399 (White, J., dissenting).
'Id. at 2389 n.6; see, e.g., Estate of Edward E. Ford, 53 T.C. 114 (1969), affd, 450 F.2d
878 (2d Cir. 1971) (settlor was named trustee with power to invade corpus; however, the trust assets
were held not includable because there were sufficient "external standards" in the trust agreement);
Estate of C. Dudley Wilson, 13 T.C. 869 (1949) (en banc), affdper curian, 187 F.2d 145 (3d Cir.
1951) (settlor had the power as trustee to accumulate or distribute the income, but this power was
clearly defined by the trust agreement).
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The Court would have done well to follow the example of State
Street Trust Co. v. United States,39 which held that even if the retained
powers taken seperately would not require inclusion, the powers consid-
ered as a whole might be so all-inclusive as to mandate inclusion in the
decedent's gross estate. The broad powers retained by Byrum would not
allow a court of equity to effectively supervise the affairs of the trust so
as to protect the income beneficiaries and the remaindermen. Since
courts are hesitant to interfere with corporate management decisions 0
and the hands of the trustees were tied as to investment policies, there
was no real power or standard that could have prevented Byrum from
achieving a substantial benefit from the voting rights and control of the
corporation. The Byrum Court, however, failed to recognize this distinc-
tion. When applied to the facts in Byrum, the State Street analysis
would require a conclusion that the powers retained by Byrum were too
broad to avoid inclusion under section 2036.41 Consequently, the Byrum
decision had gone further than any other in narrowing the inclusionary
powers of the "possession and enjoyment" clause of section 2036(a)(1).
4 2
The Court appears to have made a complete reversal of its position
in Commissioner v. Estate of Church.43 According to Church, the set-
tlor must "absolutely, unequivocally, irrevocably, and without possible
reservations part with all of his title and all of his possession and all of
his enjoyment of the transferred property."44 Byrum, for all practical
purposes, had given up almost nothing by placing his corporate stock
in trust. The stock in a closely held corporation conveys three principal
benefits: control of the corporation, income from the stock as dividends,
and a capital investment. The terms of the trust agreement and the
application of those terms effectively shielded all of these benefits from
"1363 F.2d 635 (lst Cir. 1959).
"Murray, Legal and Financial Aspects of Dividend Policy, 23 BAYLOR L. REV. 7 (1971);
Soled, supra note 31, at 217.
"State Street could be considered overruled by Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423
F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970); however, the principle expounded in State Street is still used in the area
of charitable estate tax deductions under the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2055(a)(2). See, e.g.,
Estate of Stewart v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d 1281 (3d Cir. 1971). There is no reason why the same
standard cannot also apply to § 2036.
"See, e.g., Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970) (trustee gave decedent the power
to vote the stock in trust; trust stock held not includable since decedent could not restrict the
trustee's freedom to vote or dispose of the stock); Estate of C. Dudley Wilson, 13 T.C. 869 (1949),
aff d per curiamt, 187 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1951); Estate of George H. Burr, 14 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
1189 (1945).
"335 U.S. 632 (1949).
"Id. at 645.
19721
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the income beneficiaries. Control of the corporation was retained by the
decedent in the form of the voting rights. The capital investment could
not be enjoyed by the income beneficiaries through the sale or use of
the stock as collateral because the decedent had power over any disposi-
tion of the trust assets. Income beneficiaries can only benefit from the
increase in capital growth if the growth yields a higher rate of income.
Since the stock in trust had a very low income yield, the only way the
income beneficairies could benefit would be for the trustee to sell the
stock and reinvest the corpus and the capital gain in other income-
producing property. The trustee was prevented from doing this by the
restrictions imposed by Byrum. The only benefit Byrum gave up was the
income which, for all practical purposes, was nonexistent.45
The majority failed to find a "substantial economic benefit" in the
powers retained by the decedent. Certainly it could not be said that the
income beneficiaries received a benefit as a result of their almost nonex-
istent dividend income." The failure to find a "substantial present eco-
nomic benefit" in Byrum's control over the trust property did not give
a true picture of corporate affairs,47 nor is it supported by Byrum's own
conduct in retaining control of the stock. The decedent must have con-
sidered control of the corporation valuable in that he not only guaran-
teed his voting control, but also restricted any possible disposition of the
stock that would affect that control.48 The essence of the problem is
aptly summarized by the dissent: "[T]he majority's discourse
on § 2036(a)(1) is an unconvincing rationalization for allowing Byrum
the tax free 'enjoyment' of the control privilege he retained through the
voting power of the shares he supposedly 'absolutely' and 'unequivo-
cally' gave up."4
The majority's narrow construction of section 2036(a)(2) in
construing "right" to mean a "legally enforceable power""0 to avoid the
reach of section 2036(a)(2) is erroneous in two major respects. When the
"The trust received $339 in dividends in the five years of its existence before the death of the
decedent. In the sixth year, the year of the decedent's death, $1,498 in dividends were paid to the
trust. 92 S. Ct. at 2398.
4"Id.
"See N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 87, at 343 (2d ed. 1971). A stockholder does
in fact receive substantial benefits through his control of the corporation. The power inherent in
his position allows him the enjoyment of a great deal of influence over the corporation and the
minority stockholders.
1192 S. Ct. at 2400 (White, J., dissenting).
4Id.
OMd. at 2390 states: "The term 'right,' certainly when used in a tax statute, must be given its
normal and customary meaning. It connotes an ascertainable and legally enforceable power. ... "
[Vol. 51
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majority interprets "right" as a legally enforceable right, it is using the
statute to tax the decedent based on rigid, formal control rather than
on the realities of the situation. This is contrary to legislative intent as
evidenced by the passage of the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931. 51
The Byrum decision is an unfortunate return to the May v. Heiner
52
rationale. Contrary to the opinion of the majority, United States v.
O'Malley3 cannot be used to reach this interpretation of right as con-
noting a "legally enforceable right" because the O'Malley decision was
more concerned with realities than with legal technicalities. "4 The
O'Malley Court never was concerned with the problem since the power
was enforceable. In addition, the Byrum Court in its interpretation of
section 2036(a)(2) ignores the interpretation given "right" in section
2036(a)(1) by other courts which have refused to narrow the meaning
of the statute.55 One court faced with a "right" to receive the income
from a trust that was barred by the Statute of Frauds held the trust
includible despite the unenforceable nature of the right.5 Clearly the
interpretation of the word "right" by the Court is not the normal and
customary meaning as used by other courts.
Once the restriction imposed by "legally enforceable right" is re-
moved, the issue should become whether the decedent could have desig-
"The current § 2036 was enacted in part by the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, Pub. L.
No. 131, ch. 454,46 Stat. 1516, which passed through both houses in one day due to the emergency
situation created by the decision in May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930), and two per curiam
decisions that followed shortly thereafter. May allowed a decedent to create a life estate in his
property without inclusion in his gross estate on the grounds that the property had already been
given to the remainderman prior to the death of the decedent. If allowed to stand, the May loophole
would have effectively crippled the federal estate tax. Congress clearly indicated its rejection of
such a result and attempted to revise the statute to include transactions which the objective
intention or result was in fact a testamentary disposition. The action by the Byrurn Court is clearly
a step away from this objective.
52281 U.S. 238 (1930). The May decedent created a trust under which the income was payable
to the decedent's husband for his life and upon his death payable to the decedent. The remainder
was to be distributed equally among her children upon her death. The assets of the trust were held
not includible since the transfer did not take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after her death.
The May Court relied on property law and looked at the form of the transaction as a present
transfer of future rights, an approach clearly rejected by Congress as evidenced by the immediate
passage of the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, Pub. L. No. 131, ch. 454, 46 Stat. 1516.
-383 U.S. 627 (1966).
"192 S. Ct. at 2403 (White, J., dissenting).
OSee, e.g., Skinner v. United States, 316 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963). The Skinner settlor retained
no "legally enforceable right" under the trust instrument as did O'Malley, but the trust was held
includible nonetheless.
"McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959) (an
oral agreement to receive the income from the property transferred).
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nated between the income beneficiary and the remainderman. 7 The
majority felt that he had such a right, but its use was sufficiently re-
stricted by an "external standard"58 which, under the teachings of
Jennings v. Smith, 9 would keep the trust assets out of his gross estate.
The Court compared the powers of the trustee and the powers of the
majority stockholder and then applied the "external standard" concept
to the latter. There is grave doubt, however, whether any "external
standards" exist that can be applied to the conduct of the corporate
board.60 Courts have been hesitant to interfere with the management and
business decisions of the directors of a corporation;"' therefore the threat
of a derivative suit may not in fact supply the necessary "external
standard" as supposed by the majority. Additionally, this "external
standard" on which the Court heavily relies to justify non-inclusion is
not a standard created by the trust instrument. One court, although
referring to a trustee situation, stated that an external standard cannot
be implied from extrinsic circumstances not contained in the trust agree-
ment. 2 In addition, a settlor who arranges his affairs properly can not
only avoid suit by the minority shareholders, but also can avoid the
imposition of the accumulated earnings tax on his corporations.0 The
duty owed to minority shareholders by the majority shareholders as
alleged by the majority appears to have some support.64 However, even
if such a duty could be found it could only be exercised through Byrum's
power to vote for the board of directors, but in the opinion of the Byrum
Court a majority stockholder can exercise no control over the corporate
board since the board is subject to other "external controls." 5 It would
appear that the Court's extension of the "external standard" concept of
tSee note 2 supra.
-"Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947). "External standard" is a term of art used to
describe conditions set out in the trust agreement or in the case law of the state which a court of
equity can rely on in deciding if the trustee has gone beyond the scope of his powers or has abused
his discretion. If an "external standard" exists then a trustee's actions are subject to review and
the income beneficiary and the remainderman are protected from the mistakes or wrongful acts
of the trustee.
5
'1d. Section 2036(a)(2) does not cover "powers to designate" which are non-discretionary in
nature. If the powers retained by the settlor are controlled by a determinable "external standard"
enforceable by a court having equity jurisdiction, then they are non-discretionary. See, e.g., In-
dustrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1947).
"Murray, supra note 40, at 17; Soled, supra note 31, at 217.
"See, e.g., Murray, supra note 40, at 17.
'2Biscoe v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 224 (D. Mass. 1957).
69 2 S. Ct. at 2402 (White, J., dissenting).
61H. HENN, supra note 29, § 240.
6192 S. Ct. at 2391-93.
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the trust to include the fiduciary duty of majority stockholders and
directors of the corporation to minority stockholders is not justified by
the realities of corporate life.0
The majority of the Court used the principle of "reliance" as an-
other justification for allowing Byrum to escape taxation on the trust
assets. The "principle of legitimate reliance" on clearly established case
law may be sound elsewhere, but not in this area of the law. The amount
of power which could be retained safely without invoking section 2036
was far from established.17 By allowing the decedent or his counsel to
interpret the case law as they see it and to use it as a defense to inclusion
is wholly irrational. This application will result in havoc for the courts
in attempting to apply the tax statutes.
The Byrum dissent very aptly showed that the majority's opinion
does not withstand close analysis. The Court appears to be reverting to
the pre-May v. Heiner" era of a narrow and formal interpretation of
the statute. The court hints at its motivation for such a step in a footnote
to their opinion:
The interpretation given § 2036(a) by the Government and by Mr.
Justice WHITE'S dissenting opinion would seriously disadvantage set-
tlors in a control posture. If the settlor remained a controlling stock-
holder, any transfer of stock would be taxable to the estate. . . . The
typical closely held corporation is small, has a checkered earning re-
cord and has no market for its shares. Yet its shares often have sub-
stantial asset value. To prevent the crippling liquidity problem that
would result from the imposition of estate -taxes on such shares, the
controlling shareholder's estate planning often includes an irrevocable
trust. The Government and the dissenting opinion would deny to con-
trolling shareholders the privilege of using this generally acceptable
method of estate planning without adverse tax consequences. Yet a
settlor whose wealth consisted of listed securities of Corporations he
did not control would be permitted the tax advantage of the irrevocable
trust even though his more marketable assets present a far less serious
liquidity problem. The language of the statute does not support such
"See R. BAKER & W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 403-617 (3d ed. 1959);
N. LATTIN, supra note 47, § 78; Murray, supra note 40; Soled, supra note 31.
692 S. Ct. at 2403-04 (White, J., dissenting); Gray & Covey, State Street-A Case Study of
Sections 2036(a)(2) and 2038, 15 TAX L. REV. 75 (1959).
68281 U.S. 238 (1930). May v. Heiner was the last major case under § 2036 to use the
principles of property law in defining testamentary dispositions. Congress intervened with the Joint
Resolution of March 3, 1931, indicating that Congress did not intend for property law to control
the estate tax law. See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
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a result and we cannot believe Congress intended it to have such dis-
criminatory and far-reaching impact. 9
The Court appears to fear the possibility of inequality in the application
of the statute to stockholders in a control posture. This fear is ill-
founded, as shown by the recent decision of Estate of Harry H.
Beckwith," which allowed the decedent to maintain control of voting
rights in stock he held at his death without inclusion in his gross estate
because he had no other power as to disposition and investment. This
result certainly does not put the settlor at a disadvantage. In addition,
a settlor should not be allowed to keep substantial control on property
he transfers by gift. If he is not willing to transfer the property without
strings attached, then he should not be entitled to the benefit of escaping
estate taxation on such property. A settlor is not allowed to maintain
strings -on other types of property; why then should an exception be
made in the case of a closely held corporation?
The full impact of Byrum is not clear. The scope of Byrum appears
to include settlors with one hundred percent stock ownership as well as
majority stockholders. By transferring all or a part of his stock into
trust with a third party as trustee, a settlor apparently may retain the
Byrum powers without fear of estate taxation. The transfer to a third
party trustee would create the necessary minority stockholder to whom
the board of directors would owe a fiduciary duty. The settlor could
accomplish this result with very little, if any, loss of control of the stock.
In addition, the interpretation of the statute to include only a "legally
enforceable power""1 opens up another door to the tax planner. Conceiv-
ably, a settlor might now be able to place property in trust and retain a
life estate through an oral agreement, which would be void under the
Statute of Frauds. Since the oral agreement would not be "legally en-
forceable," the trust assets would not be included in the gross estate.
Members of the settlor's family might be willing to honor the agreement
despite its unenforceability. As can be seen, Byrum opens up a whole
new area in which the prudent tax planner may avoid substantial estate
taxes for his client of which the above examples are just a couple of
"192 S. Ct. at 2397 n.34.
7055 T.C. 242 (1970). Beckwith transferred stock of a closely held corporation to a trust. He
retained voting control over that stock through the annual execution of proxies by the trustee. The
court could find no expressed or implied agreement with respect to the trust that would restrict
the trustee from either voting the stock himself or of disposing of it. It held the stock was not
includible in the decedent's gross estate.
7See note 50 supra.
[Vol. 51
SUCCESSOR EMPLO YERS
many possible avoidance schemes. The full impact may not be perfectly
clear until the lower courts begin to apply Byrum, but apparently Byrum
has created a substantial loophole in the estate tax field.
The Byrum decision creates a gross inequity in favor of a settlor
with substantial stock interest. It gives him control benefits that a settlor
with land or other types of property interests would not dream of retain-
ing without fear of estate taxation. The Court has also gutted a major
portion of section 2036 with its interpretation of "right," which has
severely limited the scope of this section. However, the tax loophole
created gives Congress a compelling opportunity finally to clarify its
intention as to the scope of section 2036 after so many years of court
indecision and confusion. 72 If Congress accepts this opportunity, the tax
planner might finally be able to advise his client with some assurance
as to the effect of his transfer.
WILLIAM L. TANKERSLEY III
Labor Law-The Obligations of a Successor Employer.
"In taking over a going concern or labor force, the labor title is to
be searched as diligently as the title to real property."' A number of
labor disputes have arisen from uncertainty as to the obligations owed
by the acquiring company to the predecessor's union following the
merger with or acquisition of a unionized business. The recent Supreme
Court decision in NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.
2
should dispel some of the confusion stemming from prior court and
National Labor Relations Board attempts to interpret the mandates of
the Labor Management Relations Act' (the Act) in regard to the labor
obligations of the successor employer.
4
Imposition of successorship status upon the acquiring corporation
2Convey, Section 2036-The New Problem Child of the Federal Estate Tax, 4 TAX COUNSEL
Q. 121 (1960).
'Sangerman, The Labor Obligations of the Successor to a Unionized Business, 19 LAB. L.J.
160 (1968), quoting City Packing Corp. (1948) (no further citation given; probably an unpublished
arbitration decision).
292 S. Ct. 1571 (1972).
'Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1970).
'John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), in which the Court reserved
decision on the question of survival of the previously negotiated collective bargaining agreement,
was used as the rationale for the Board's mistaken conclusion that the entire collective bargaining
agreement survived the change in ownership. The Board's order in the Burns case was a result of
its interpretation of the meaning of Wiley.
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